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Abstract: 
The link between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities and financial performance 
of firms has been intensively examined and debated in academics and politics, but the 
connection to innovation has so far lacked research attention. This paper investigates whether 
CSR is complementary to environmental innovations, so that a joint introduction of both 
strategies generates a higher financial performance than the application of one or none of the 
strategies. We analyse if environmental innovators can generate higher financial performance 
by signalling their environmental engagement through CSR. For this purpose, we use panel 
data of environmental R&D activity together with a CSR variable on the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) and analyse their effect on the financial performance of a firm. The novelty of 
our work is the complementary approach with which we examine the effect of a joint strategy 
of environmental R&D and CSR on financial performance. Although our results support the 
view of strategic complements for environmental R&D and GRI, we cannot conclude that this 
is also true for other types of CSR signalling environmental engagement.  
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1. Introduction 
In the last years, an increasing environmental awareness in the societies of especially 
industrialized countries can be recognized. The consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) a price 
mark-up for 'green' products provides the opportunity for firms to gain profits and separate 
from competitors by offering such products (Russo and Fouts 1997) or by revealing their 
over-compliance on unobservable attributes through voluntary programs with publicly 
available information. Empirical evidence provide e.g. Arora and Cason (1995) and for 
theoretical background on vertical differentiation see Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995). 
Bénabou and Tirole (2010) classify this phenomenon as delegated philanthropy of 
stakeholders. The industry makes use of this trend by supplying products including 
environmental and sustainable aspects in the production process or with products shaped to fit 
the changed customers' expectations. These often called 'green' products can be subsumed as 
impure public goods in economic literature (see e.g. Kotchen 2006). Furthermore, on the 
capital market ‘green’ investors might also be attracted by firms providing such goods or 
producing in a socially and environmentally friendly way (see Graff Zivin and Small 2005 as 
one of the few theoretical concepts in this context).3  
It is noticeable that in recent years more and more companies appear to be socially and 
environmentally responsible on a voluntary basis (Poddi and Vergalli 2009). These voluntary 
actions of firms are called Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The reasons for such a self-
regulation can be divided into three main categories (see Lyon and Maxwell 2008).4 The first 
one is cost saving considerations. This is especially true in the environmental context where 
e.g. the reduction of used resources or energy efficiency measures lead to less environmental 
impact of production and at the same time can decrease costs (see Porter and van der Linde 
1995). Second, voluntary action could be applied to avoid future threats of regulation (see 
Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett 2000 for a theoretical approach) or attacks by activists (for 
theoretical models see Baron 2009, Baron and Diermeier 2007, Calveras and Ganuza 2007, 
Feddersen and Gilligan 2001). And third, voluntary social or environmental action could be 
driven by the demand side of ‘green’ consumers or ‘green’ investors, on which we base the 
considerations of our paper.  
In this paper we concentrate on voluntary actions of firms in the environmental context. The 
communication of the firm's environmental performance can help the firm in its competition 
for socially responsible clients (Kitzmueller and Shimshack 2012). The firm knows about its 
environmentally friendly activities, but for its consumers, workers and investors, this 
information is not easy to get, to aggregate or to compare (Bénabou and Tirole 2010). While 
products can carry information about their environmental performance, this information is not 
directly observable for processes. Akerlof (1970) originally addressed the problem of 
information asymmetry arising from either adverse selection – when managers do not share 
3 There is a rich body of empirical evidence on the impact of regulation-triggered compliance activities on firm 
performance. Although previous research on this issue has been initiated starting in the early 1980s after the US 
and other industrialized nations introduce stricter environmental regulations, there is, however, no clear-cut 
picture of this relationship even until today. The rather early research is reviewed by Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, 
and Stavins (1995) whereas a more recent survey is offered by Ambec et al. (2013).  
4 Please see Lyon and Maxwell (2008) for a detailed discussion of the theoretical approaches and the welfare 
aspects of CSR.  
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information – or from unobservable attributes (moral hazard) and provided examples like 
certification to overcome information asymmetry. We argue that CSR can carry unobservable 
organizational qualities to reduce information asymmetry. This is based on the signalling 
model explained by Spence (1973) for the job market context and applied to the financial 
market by e.g. Ross (1977) or Bhattacharya (1979), in which signals serve as information on 
unobservable attributes (see Spence 2002).5 The critical requirement for such signals is that 
the costs are high enough to prevent low performing firms from defection and low enough 
that the high performing firms can profit from disclosure (see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts 1986, 
Watts and Zimmermann 2002, pp 164-165). Nevertheless, Wernerfelt (1988) shows for 
brands signalling new product’s quality that these restrictive assumptions might be defined 
down. The main theoretical assumption behind is that signalling becomes cheaper for those 
firms with high reputation, e.g. branding, as these firms can built up on previous reputation 
and signal not only for a single product, but for a bunch of products. On the other side, 
sending false signals is more costly from the signalling period onwards than sending no signal 
at all. We apply the idea of reputational economies of scales by Wernerfelt (1988) to our 
approach while CSR not signalling the specific attributes of one product, but the firm’s 
environmental R&D activity as a whole. CSR certification – such as the Global Report 
Initiative (GRI) – are regarded as credible signal to transport firms’ attributes which cannot be 
observed easily and creates reputation (see e.g. Toms 2002). Like in Terlaak and King (2006), 
we assume that CSR signals these desired qualifications of firms, in our case information 
about the environmental attributes of a firm. As such, CSR enhances the reputation on 
environmental activities of the firm which is rewarded at the market by consumers, investors 
or business partners.  
The research question is, whether a joint strategy of environmental innovation and CSR 
engagement leads to a higher financial performance than a decision for either one or none of 
these strategies. In this paper we analyse if firms can generate higher financial performance 
by jointly implementing both strategies compared to specialising in the environmental 
context. We focus on environmental R&D and CSR, which could signal environmental 
attributes of firms. In specific, we use Thompson and Reuters ASSET4 (A4) database of large 
global companies in panel-structure to analyse the long-term effects of a joint implementation 
of environmental R&D and CSR action on the firm’s market value accounted for by the price-
to-sales ratio. The underlying assumption is that CSR signals the environmental performance 
of a firm, in our approach the environmental R&D engagement, which indicates not only the 
current firm’s activity, but also the long-term engagement into environmental responsibility. 
The results support the view that both strategies (to be active in environmental innovation and 
certified CSR) act as strategic complements in terms of companies’ market value. Introducing 
a single strategy alone does not significantly affect financial performance while companies 
that adopted both strategies jointly are observed to have a significantly higher market value 
scaled by total sales compared to the control group. In this sense, the results support the view 
that a credible signal is needed to successfully disclose otherwise private information on 
companies' environmental performance. The disclosure of information on environmental 
5 Please see Riley (2001) for an overview and discussion on the literature of signalling. 
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performance can be seen as a signal for the amount of companies’ R&D expenditures 
allocated to environmental innovation strategies that are otherwise rather hard to observe. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews related research and 
discusses how the current paper contributes to the ongoing debate. Section 3 provides 
theoretical thoughts on the underlying mechanism based on theories of the firm. This section 
serves as a theoretical guidance for the choice of variables described in Section 4 and the 
empirical analyses described and set up in Section 5 followed by the presentation and 
discussion of the results in section 6 and further robustness checks in section 7. Section 8 
concludes and Section 9 provides managerial implications. 
2. Related literature 
The term Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is not commonly defined. In literature and 
practice several definitions exist, but two common aspects of CSR can be found in these 
definitions: CSR activities relate to social and environmental issues and go beyond legal 
requirements. For our analyses we use a CSR variable (explained later in detail) based on this 
definition which covers profit-maximising, profit-neutral and profit-sacrificing CSR actions.6 
The development of the topic CSR in the research agenda can be visualised with published 
journal articles (see Figure 1 Appendix). The number of CSR articles has increased especially 
in the last 10 years with a shift in the years 2007 to 2011. The percentage, however, of the 
total amount of publications in Management and Economy is rather small. Concerning the 
topic innovation, the publications have increased from the 1970s onwards with a huge shift in 
the years 2007 to 2011 and with a large share of overall publications in Management and 
Economy. In the empirical research on CSR, an overwhelming number of studies address the 
connection of CSR and financial performance (FP), mostly focusing on how CSR influences 
financial performance. Cochran and Wood (1984), Pava and Krausz (1996), as well as Griffin 
and Mahon (1997) provide literature reviews of early research in their studies. The meta-
analyses by Orlitzky et al. (2003) or Margolis et al. (2007) give an impression on the huge 
number of empirical studies on the CSR-FP relationship. Their overall results indicate a 
positive correlation of CSR and FP. As such, Orlitzky et al. (2003) find a bi-directional 
relationship and a slightly positive effect of CSR on FP (Margolis et al. 2007).  
However, empirical analyses taking innovation as a factor in the empirical estimations into 
account are rare. Hart and Ahuja (1996) include innovation in form of R&D per sales as a 
control variable for their analyses of how CSR affects different types of operational and 
financial performances of a firm. They observe a positive effect of preventing pollution on 
financial performance with a one or two year time-lag. The empirical research by McWilliams 
6 Besides this broad sense of definition also narrower interpretations of CSR can be found in which CSR goes 
along with profit losses. Starting with the article by Friedman (1970) to the more recently published paper by 
Reinhardt et al. (2008) who clearly understand CSR as sacrificing profits by referring to Elhauge (2005). This 
profit-sacrificing type of CSR is also called altruistic CSR (see e.g. Baron 2001, Baron 2010, takes the altruistic 
explanation in a broader sense with the term reciprocal altruism, which is conditional on partners action and 
benefits). This viewpoint with firm's profits and pro-social or environmental behaviour as trade-offs is for 
example criticised by Bowen (2007). Carroll (2013) takes the different viewpoints on social responsibility 
together as four responsibilities of a firm, namely economic, legal ethical and discretionary responsibilities. The 
two last once include voluntary action by the firm, but leave open how they would affect the financial 
performance of a firm. 
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and Siegel (2000) is based on two main arguments: innovation has a positive effect on FP, and 
CSR and innovation are strongly correlated. They prove that ignoring innovation might lead 
to an over-estimation of the CSR effect on financial performance, as they find a neutral effect 
of CSR on FP as soon as innovation is included as explanatory variable. Hull and Rothenberg 
(2008) extend the study by McWilliams and Siegel (2000) with an additional model in which 
CSR and innovation are not only included as single variables, but also as interaction terms. 
They base their approach on the assumption that firms can differentiate via innovation or 
CSR. They conclude that CSR positively influences FP, furthermore that innovation is an 
important explanatory variable in this context, and that innovation and CSR are substitutes in 
terms of firm differentiation. Another study based on McWilliams and Siegel (2000) is 
conducted by Lioui and Sharma (2012) who examine how environmental CSR affects return-
on-assets (ROA) and Tobin's Q directly and indirectly via R&D. They construct a possible 
additional return on R&D investments of CSR firms with an interaction term of CSR and 
innovation. They explain the negative direct effect of CSR on FP with the costs of CSR 
measures and attribute the positive indirect effect to more efficient R&D (Lioui and Sharma 
2012). In contrast to these studies, we investigate whether a CSR measure signalling pro-
environmental action of the firm is complementary to environmental innovations – so that a 
joint introduction of both generates higher financial performance – or if a substitutive 
character can be verified. Cavaco and Crifo (2014) also use a complementarity approach, but 
in their case they employ it to analyse three dimensions of CSR, namely responsible 
behaviour towards employees, customers and suppliers, and the environment. They find that 
firms caring about employees and at the same time about customers and suppliers can gain 
profits. Furthermore, firms should decide on either environmentally friendly behaviour or 
responsible behaviour towards customers and suppliers and not engage in both of them at the 
same time.  
Beside these studies which mostly use scores as an overall indicator for firm’s social and 
environmental activities, research with a focus on environmental performance is of interest for 
our analysis. This literature is strongly related to the Porter hypothesis, stating that 
environmental regulation implies innovation and in turn generates a competitive advantage for 
a firm (see Porter and van der Linde 1995). Rexhäuser and Rammer (2014) test the Porter 
hypothesis for German companies and find that it does not hold in general and depends on the 
type of environmental innovation. A study closely related to the CSR context by Klassen and 
McLaughlin (1996) empirically examines the effect of environmental awards on financial 
performance. In their event study on the firm level, they find significantly positive effects. 
Another study by Konar and Cohen (2001) shows that negative environmental performance 
effects financial performance negatively. They measure the environmental performance as 
emitted toxic chemicals and as lawsuits against the firm. Russo and Fouts (1997) use 
environmental ratings as environmental performance indicators and observe a positive impact 
on financial performance. Research approaches using panel data have arisen in the last years, 
to respond to the criticism of not considering unobserved firm heterogeneity in cross-sectional 
studies. Among them is a study on US firms by King and Lenox (2001) showing that firms' 
attributes may drive the effect on financial performance. Elsayed and Paton (2005) find in a 
dynamic panel data analysis for UK firms that there is a neutral effect of environmental 
performance on financial performance. Telle (2006) confirms this result for Norwegian firms.  
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Connected to the research on environmental performance and its effect on a firm’s 
performance are empirical studies on environmental management systems (EMS). Studies on 
the determinants of environmental management systems reveal that consumer preferences 
have a strong impact on firms’ engagement in EMS certification (Nakamura et al. 2001, 
Potoski and Prakash 2005, Nishitani 2009, Nishitani 2010). In contrast, Harrington et al. 
(2008) find that firms' internal factors are the driving forces to implement environmental 
management. Further empirical research focuses on the effects of EMS on either the 
environmental performance to evaluate the usage of EMS as a policy instrument (see e.g. 
Dasgupta et al. 2000, King and Lenox 2000) or on innovation (see e.g. Wagner 2007 for 
German firms). Concerning the effect of EMS on firm performance, Melnyk et al. (2003) 
examine the relative effects of uncertified and certified EMS based on a survey among North 
American managers and find that EMS have a positive effect on environmental as well as 
firms’ performance. Rennings et al. (2006) examine both the effect of EMS on technical 
innovations as well as on financial performance. They find that the learning process of EMS 
has a positive effect on product innovation, which in turn positively influences economic 
performance. An event study by Cañón-de-Francia and Garcés-Ayerbe (2009) shows that 
proactive EMS engagement leads to positive and reactive EMS to negative market returns.  
More related to the signalling concept is research especially applied to the ISO 9000 and the 
ISO 14000 standard as certified standards (see Heras-Saizarbitoria and Boiral 2013 for a 
literature overview).7 Heras-Saizarbitoria and Boiral (2013) categorize signalling models as 
non-technical, theoretical approaches. Terlaak and King (2006) apply certified standards to 
the signalling model and find that the ISO 9000 certification leads to a competitive advantage 
especially in large and advertising-intensive industries with high information costs. However, 
there are studies finding no support that ISO 14000 certification has a positive effect on 
financial performance (e.g. Heras-Saizarbitoria et al. 2011 for Spanish firms) or even has a 
negative effect on the market value if the firms are less polluting and less internationalised 
(Cañón-de-Francia and Garcés-Ayerbe 2009). Nevertheless, Toms (2002) shows for UK firms 
that the disclosure of firm’s environmental activities in annual reports creates reputation. The 
reputation may in turn lead to a competitive advantage.  
Based on these empirical studies, our approach, which analyses if CSR, signalling 
environmental engagement, is complementary to environmental innovation and effects 
financial performance positively, seems plausible. Contrary to the neoclassical assumption 
that CSR engagement always means sacrificing profits (Friedman 1970), we rather rely on a 
win-win assumption of CSR and financial performance. This is in line with the conclusion by 
Orlitzky (2005) that CSR and financial performance are no trade-offs and also supports the 
legal aspect that it is not easy for a manager to sacrifice profits in the social interest 
(Reinhardt et al. 2008). Nevertheless, our approach aims to shed light on the connection of 
CSR and innovation and their effect on financial performance – complementary or 
substitutive.  
 
 
7 In contrast, the ISO 26000 is only a guideline for companies how they should behave, but do not include any 
requirements. Therefore, ISO 26000 is not certifiable like ISO 14000 and ISO 9000. 
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3. Theory of the firm and hypothesis 
Firm theory and CSR strategy 
Husted and Allen (2000, 2007a, 2007b) explain the strategic allocation of resources to fulfil 
social objectives in the long-run and at the same time to gain profits as a ‘corporate social 
strategy’. But how is this corporate social strategy connected to the overall firm strategy? 
Especially when researchers like Margolis et al. (2007) state that most studies only analyse 
the unilateral relationship between CSR and financial performance, but the mechanisms and 
the direction of causality are unclear. Although, most literature explaining the relation of CSR 
and financial performance are either related to the slack resources approach or the stakeholder 
approach, the overall firm strategy is often neglected. The neoclassical firm theory with 
rational actors aiming at maximising profits might fall short to explain CSR activities. The 
behavioural and the resource-based theory of the firm provide explanations of firms’ CSR 
engagement (Bowen 2007, Branco and Rodrigues 2006), which we focus on in our analyses 
of the relationship between innovation, CSR and financial performance.8 
The behavioural theory is traced back to Cyert and March (1963) with the assumption of 
mangers’ bounded rationality as the main difference to neoclassical firm theory. Furthermore, 
firms are seen as coalitions of individuals with personal values. Therefore, several 
endogenously arising organisational goals with possibly contradicting character exist. 
Applying the behavioural theory to a CSR strategy reveals the importance of slack resources 
in this context. As such the slack resources (see e.g. Waddock and Graves 1997, Orlitzky et 
al. 2003) as well as the so-called available funding theory (Preston and O’Bannon 1997) 
imply that prior FP is associated with subsequent CSR. One example for such a CSR activity 
is the action of donating. At least the decision on the amount of the donation depends on the 
financial resources of the company. This would imply that firms with a better financial 
performance than their counterparts have more freely available resources, which can be used 
for CSR activities. Examples for empirical analyses on the slack resources theory are 
McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis (1988) and Waddock and Graves (1997). Nevertheless, 
Bowen (2007) emphasises the necessity of slack resources but, as behavioural theory suppose 
personal values as the origin of a social strategy, slack resources (as e.g. strong finances) 
alone do not lead to CSR engagement.  
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm, which goes back to Penrose (1959), takes the 
perspective that a firm is a bundle of resources (Wernerfelt 1984) with the two main 
assumptions of resource heterogeneity and resource immobility (see Bowen 2007). Therefore, 
the RBV takes the standpoint that competitive advantage is created within the firm depending 
on the characteristics and usage of its resources. Especially unique resources and their clever 
deployment contribute to the firm’s success. Thus, these specific firm capabilities can 
generate competitive advantage in the long-run. According to Branco and Rodrigues (2006), 
reputation is an intangible resource which could be affected by firm’s CSR activity.  
8 See also Bowen (2007) for distinction to the neoclassical theory of firms and a discussion on applicability to 
firms’ behaviour of the different theories. 
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Although the RBV focuses on the firm’s internal characteristics, the external environment 
determines the organisational goals by threats from stakeholders (see e.g. Wernerfelt 1984).9 
In general, the stakeholder concept means the inclusion of interests not only of shareholders 
per se, but also of outside stakeholders. Freeman (2010, p 25) describes stakeholders as "[…] 
any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm's 
objectives." Donaldson and Preston (1995, figure 2) specify groups like governments, 
investors, political groups, suppliers, trade associations, employees, communities and 
customers. According to Freeman (2010), the difference of the stakeholder approach to CSR 
lies in the extension to additional stakeholders. CSR is a source of capabilities driven by 
stakeholders when applying the corporate social strategy to RBV.10 As such CSR creates 
reputation and in turn increases financial performance (see e.g. McGuire et al. 1988, Waddock 
and Graves 1997), which is described as lead-lag relationship by Preston and O’Bannon 
(1997). In the environmental context, empirical examples for the application of RBV on CSR 
are researched by Hart (1995) or Russo and Fouts (1997). 
Hypothesis based on firm strategy 
In this paper, we analyse the effect of environmental innovation and CSR on FP. In this sense, 
we expect that CSR increases the marginal financial returns by introducing environmental 
innovation compared to a control group. This is because firms with environmental innovations 
and certified CSR are expected to have a better financial performance, as they can 
differentiate themselves from their competitors by verifying their environmentally friendly 
behaviour through CSR and verify their ongoing engagement in the future through todays’ 
R&D spending and thus convince stakeholders such as consumers, investors, and trading 
partners with this reputation. We test the hypothesis whether firms that jointly innovate and 
engage in CSR have better financial performance values. We assume that this is in 
congruence with the signalling hypothesis and the RBV theory of the firm, as especially the 
returns to (or outcome of) R&D investments are hard to observe (see e.g. Aboody and Lev 
2000, Chauvin and Hirschey 1994) and can be seen as intangible assets. The same may hold 
true in particular for the case of environmental R&D efforts and its outcome. We assume that 
CSR serves as a signal to overcome this information asymmetry by at least partial disclosure 
of a firm’s environmental activities, especially related to environmental R&D and thus a long-
term engagement into environmental responsibility. This in turn helps to create a firm’s 
positive reputation and trustworthiness and might also support the company in vertical 
differentiation from their competitors (see. e.g. Fombrun 1996, Fombrun and Shanley 1990). 
Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis for our analysis on complementarity of 
environmental R&D and CSR. 
Hypothesis: Firms jointly engaged in environmental innovations as well as CSR can gain 
ceteris paribus better financial performance (market values scaled by total sales).  
As such, we analyse the joint implementation of environmental innovation and CSR and 
compare their effect on financial performance to firms that neither introduced environmental 
9 The internal and external environment of the firm and how to relate these aspects is also object of the 
contingency theory. Smith and Lewis (2011) relate the stakeholder perspective to contingency theory as 
performing paradoxes, where multiple stakeholders demand different actions.  
10 See Bowen (2007) for implications of RBV for CSR.  
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innovations nor CSR or only introduced one of those strategies independently of the other. 
Therefore, the causal direction is based on the RBV of the firm, even though our analysis 
allows also for neutral, negative or positive effects on financial performance. Furthermore, by 
discussing the signalling effect of CSR on clients beforehand, we contribute to the stakeholder 
theory with our research. 
Our complementary approach tests if the joint introduction of innovation and CSR generates 
higher financial performance. The complementary approach enables us to differentiate 
between four exclusive types of engagement: companies just doing environmental innovation 
alone, companies exclusively engaged in CSR, companies jointly engaged in innovation and 
CSR, and companies neither innovating nor being active in CSR. This allows us not only to 
analyse if environmental innovation and CSR are complementary, but also the contrary 
substitutive relation. For our analysis we focus on environmental concerns of innovations and 
CSR. 
4. Database and Descriptive Statistics 
We base our research on worldwide company panel data from the Thompson and Reuters 
ASSET4 (A4) database, which allows us to get better insight into the process organisation of 
a company than by only using CSR score data (like in the CSR context often used Kinder, 
Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) database). Mainly large companies based in the US are included in 
the A4 database. The unbalanced panel A4 contains a collection of environmental, social, 
governance and financial data of more than 3,000 global companies listed in major indices 
such as S&P 500, MSCI Europe, FTSE 350 and the MSCI World Index, Stoxx 300, Nasdaq, 
ASX 200. Publicly available information of a company (e.g. reports, but also other publicly 
available sources) is gathered yearly (beginning in 2002) by specially trained analysts with an 
increasing number of screened companies. Besides various factors of firm performance (such 
as stock market value, return on assets, among others) and the information on various CSR 
characteristics, the dataset provides a rather limited amount of information on central firm-
specific factors likely affecting firms’ stock market value (e.g. patent stock). 
Nevertheless, the panel data structure allows us to provide formal tests on whether CSR 
complements firms' environmental innovations in terms of financial performance or has a 
substitutive character. The restricted sample for our estimations consists of 6,737 observations 
including 1,945 firms. The sample extends over the years 2005 to 2009 as an unbalanced 
panel to ensure the availability of a two years’ time lag for each variable (see Figure 2 
Appendix).11  
The variables of interest for our research on whether CSR complements environmental 
innovating companies are represented by 1,039 observations of environmental innovators 
(Figure 3) and 1,501 observations on CSR engagement (Figure 4) over the years 2005-2009. 
As the number of observations varies in the unbalanced panel, also the number of firms that 
reported environmental R&D and CSR varies over the periods. The share of green innovators 
is over 5% in each year and the share of CSR active firms is higher than 8% in each year. 
11 The drop in 2009 is due to the unbalanced panel structure and the availability of data needed for the 
estimations explainable. The raw data shows an increase of screened companies over the years. 
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Figure 5 shows the number of observations of the years for the four exclusive types of 
engagement. In the observed years 2005-2009, most companies are not engaged in either one 
of the strategies. However, in all the years there are observations for all four categories.  
As in the database, the observations of the restricted sample are comprised of mainly the 
following countries: United States (33%), Japan (18%), and United Kingdom (14%). The 
European countries are represented with about 39% of the observations. Concerning the four 
exclusive categories by continents, Figure 6 provides an overview that the most observations 
are from Europe, US, and Asia. Especially in Europe and Asia there are more observations of 
firms engaged in both strategies than on the other continents.  
Furthermore, the 12 industry sectors are covered according to the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) (Table 7). The finance, insurance and real estate sector is highly 
represented in our sample (19%), followed by the Transport sector (13%). Nevertheless, the 
various manufacturing industries result in almost the half of the observations in the sample 
(43%) when taken together. With respect to the exclusive categories, Figure 7 displays that 
most observations are from the finance, insurance and real estate sector with only a few 
observations showing innovation or innovation and CSR engagement jointly. As product and 
process innovations are especially relevant for non-service sector, we find innovating firms or 
firms engaged in both strategies particularly in the manufacturing sectors.  
The descriptive analysis of environmental R&D and CSR indicates a correlation between both 
strategies. In the sample, the joint realisation of environmental innovation and CSR occurs 
with a higher frequency than the implementation of environmental innovation alone (Table 1). 
Table 1: Adoption Decision and Relative Frequencies 
 CSR    CSR  
EnvInno 0 1 Total  EnvInno 0 1 Total 
0 
4,754 
(4,429) 
944 
(1,270) 
5,698  0 
83.43% 
(77.73%) 
16.57% 
(22.29%) 
84.58% 
1 
482 
(808) 
557 
(232) 
1,039  1 
46.39% 
(77.67%) 
53.61% 
(22.33%) 
15.42% 
Total 5,236 1,501 6,737  Total 77.72% 22.28% 100.00% 
Expected frequencies appear in parentheses. 
Pearson chi²(1)=696.3276, Pr=0.000 
Kendall’s tau-b =0.3215, P>z=0.0000 
 
Table 1 also shows the frequency under the assumption of independency of both firm 
strategies in parentheses. Interestingly, if both strategy variables were independent, we would 
expect that only 232 firms had introduced both strategies jointly. However, the firms that 
actually implemented both are more than twice the number we would expect in case of 
independency. Together with the very high coefficient of association (Kendall’s tau-b), Table 
1 offers strong evidence for high correlation between environmental innovation and CSR of a 
firm. This is in line with considerations by Terlaak (2007) that firms in R&D intensive 
industries can gain competitive advantage with certified standards. Nevertheless, the 
correlation of course is not sufficient for complementarity to be present. Whether this 
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correlation survives multivariate statistics controlling for any other influencing factors and 
whether it really stems from complementarity is subject to the following empirical analysis. 
Although the key variables of interest (i.e. whether CSR and environmental R&D are 
implemented) are binary indicators, they vary considerably over time within the firms (see 
Table 8 in the appendix). 33.26% of the 1,945 firms in our sample had CSR implemented in at 
least one year, whereas environmental R&D has been reported at least once for 24.27% of the 
firms. Approximately 9.51% of the firms reported CSR in place in all observed years. The 
respective number for environmental R&D is much lower, namely 6.84%. More interestingly, 
22.51% of all firms introduced CSR at a certain year and continued doing CSR in all 
following years, which is approximately 67.70% of all firms observed to have CSR 
introduced in at least one year. In total, 24.27% of all firms are observed to have reported 
environmental R&D at least once within the period 2005-2009. 15.42% of all firms did 
environmental R&D in a certain year and continued doing so in all the following years. This 
is 63.56% of all the firms that are observed as having done environmental R&D at least in one 
year. 2% of all 1,945 firms change their engagement over time with respect to R&D and 
1.23% with respect to CSR activities.  
5. Estimation Strategy 
5.1. Complementary Approach Basic Model 
Complementarity (in the sense of Edgeworth) in firm strategies means that doing more of one 
activity increases the marginal returns of doing more of the other. Which means that, certified 
CSR may signal environmental responsibility and thus increase the returns to environmental 
R&D by making customers and stakeholders aware of this. In principle, there are two ways to 
estimate such a relationship: the adoption approach and the productivity approach, which is 
central to the present paper. Roughly put, the adoption approach relies on the correlation of 
two firm strategies in order to account for complementarity. Note that this approach is only 
valid in case of continuous strategy measures (Miravete and Pernías 2010) and thus not 
applicable in this paper.12 
The productivity approach is not restricted to continuous variables and accounts for the 
performance effects of the potential complementary variables with respect to an objective 
function – in our case price-per-sales (P/S). Milgrom and Roberts (1990) show that the 
concept of complementarity is directly related to supermodularity of the objective function. 
That is, a positive mixed partial derivative of a twice differentiable with respect to the two 
strategy variables indicates complementarity. More importantly, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) 
show that this concept also applies to binary strategy indicators in case they are defined over a 
sublattice.13 
Roughly put, this means imposing an order on each pairwise combination of the variables. We 
begin with the smallest element in the order {0,0} which means here that neither CSR nor 
environmental innovation is done. Elements ranked higher in this order denoted as {1,0} and 
12 The adoption approach can be traced back to the work of Arora and Gambardella (1990). They show that a 
positive covariance among a pair of activity variables indicate complementarity if the activity variables are 
conditioned on any other firm-specific characteristics. For an overview of empirical studies, please see 
Brynjolfsson and Milgrom (2013) 
13 See also Milgrom and Roberts (1995) for an overview on lattice theory and complementarity.  
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{0,1}, represent either environmental innovation only or exclusive CSR engagement, 
respectively. Finally, the highest element in this order {1,1} accounts for joint use of the two 
firm strategies. This order directly translates into the case of complementarity with 
continuously measurable variables. Putting it differently, this condition implies that adopting 
both strategies jointly leads to higher performance than adopting both in isolation, simply 
because the one increases the marginal returns of the other. Formally, the condition for 
supermodularity and complementarity reads as follows:  
𝑓𝑓(1,0) + 𝑓𝑓(0,1) ≤ 𝑓𝑓(1,1) + 𝑓𝑓(0,0), (1) 
where 𝑓𝑓(. ) represents the objective function, P/S in our case, see Milgrom and Roberts 
(1990). In what follows, we are interested in incorporating the strategy measures in a 
meaningful representation of an objective function to get reliable and unbiased estimates. 
Needless to say, special interest is paid to separate causality from underlying correlation. 
Let 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represent firm 𝑖𝑖’s absolute market capitalisation in year 𝑡𝑡. The market capitalisation 
(or market value) is assumed to depend on the sum of the firm’s physical assets (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and 
intangible (knowledge) assets (hereinafter 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) so that 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). Intangible knowledge 
is typically accounted for by a distributed lag representation of all past investments into R&D 
(Griliches 1981, among others14), namely 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1,𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2, … ,𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑛𝑛 forming the 
firm’s stock of productive knowledge. Assuming that patents are a noisy measurement of the 
past investments into R&D (say, 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−1,𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−2, … ,𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖−𝑛𝑛) as frequently done (see for 
instance Griliches 1979), it can be replaced by the number of patents hold by firm 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡 
denoted by 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Note that patents are not the first best indicator of intangible assets. 
Patent protection cannot be granted for every invention or productive knowledge asset. In 
particular, patent protection as a way to protect intellectual property against the use of others 
is used not equally across different sectors and for different inventions, i.e. for product and 
process inventions (Levin et al. 1987). Thus, the propensity to patents is very likely to differ, 
so patents are a rather biased indicator of intangible assets, but an easily available one. Given 
our data, a much more serious problem is the non-availability of information on physical 
assets of firms. This, in combination with the problems associated with the measurement of 
intangible assets, motivates the use of lagged market capitalisation information to account for 
assets. Scaling market capitalisation by firms’ total sales is a frequently used15 size-
independent measurement for the firms’ value created by each single dollar of sales – the 
price-to-sales ratio, henceforth 𝑃𝑃/𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. The resulting regression equation reads as follows: 
 ln (𝑃𝑃/𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝ln (𝑃𝑃/𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝛽𝛽10𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽01𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑪𝑪𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 + ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
 
where 𝑪𝑪𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of controls, and ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖= 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 with 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 denoting firm-specific fixed 
effects and 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 an idiosyncratic error component. 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 accounts for the choice in favour of 
environmental innovation alone (i.e. without introducing CSR). 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes that CSR is in 
14 See in particular the surveys by Griliches et al. (1986) and Griliches (1990). 
15 Comparable studies use measures like Tobin’s q to relate environmental regulation or environmental 
innovation to firms’ market value and financial performance, such as Dowell et al. (2000) or Konar and Cohen 
(2001). 
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place alone while the dummy 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indicates that both strategies are introduced jointly so 
that no implementation of either strategy serves as the reference group so that 𝛽𝛽00 is 
necessarily zero. Note that the price-to-sales ratio is measured as the end of the year value. 
Furthermore, the literature assumes rather a very short event window in which upcoming 
information on firms’ CSR activities and environmental innovation affect the market value 
(see e.g. Cañón-de-Francia and Garcés-Ayerbe 2009). However, we assume a rather long 
event window of a whole year. This is simply due to data availability. In this sense, the key 
variables of interest, 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 enter the model in the same year as the 
dependent variable. Needless to say, the strategy variables to introduce environmental 
innovation or to be active in CSR (and have it certified) cannot be considered strictly 
exogenous, as they are endogenous choices of firms that may dependent on firms’ market 
value. If providing a credible signal for sustainability (by having certified CSR measures in 
places) really complements the investment in environmental R&D and translates in higher 
firm values, clever managers are likely aware of this issue. As good management is likely to 
be correlated with higher market values, omitting a control for management may cause the 
strategy variables to be biased, as management remains an unexplained error component and 
thus 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐�𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,� ≠ 0, 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐�𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅,∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,� ≠ 0, and of course 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐�𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,� ≠ 0. Thus, 
the empirical model needs to handle the endogeneity of the main variables of interest. Using 
one-year lagged values of the key variables of interest to rule out potential problems of 
endogeneity does not help here as we assume a rather short-term event window in which 
upcoming information on CSR and environmental innovation can affect firms’ market value.  
Using lagged price-to-sales ratio information to control for physical and intangible assets does 
not come without any costs. The price of a dynamic panel specification is to use potentially 
predetermined and thus not strictly exogenous regressors. Especially the lagged dependent 
variable is likely to be correlated with current errors via its correlation with past ones, thus 
making the classical linear regression model inconsistent, even if ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, is not autocorrelated. 
Another problem arises as neither the lagged dependent variable allows controlling for all 
differences in the price-to-sales ratio across firms nor does the vector of controls (𝑪𝑪𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). These 
unexplained differences in the between dimension of the panel data (i.e. across firms) may be 
correlated with at least some of the regressors making their coefficient estimates biased. 
Several ways to deal with predetermined regressors have been proposed. Anderson and Hsiao 
(1981) propose the use of instrumental variable regressions where all variables (left-hand and 
right-hand side) enter the model in first differences so that firm-specific effects are eliminated 
(and thus their potential correlation with the regressors). The violation of the strict exogeneity 
assumption with respect to the lagged dependent variable is addressed by using instruments, 
for instance the lagged differences or a further lag of the variable in levels. As this estimator 
is considered relatively inefficient, another (and more frequently used) estimation approach 
has been developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Their dynamic panel GMM estimator 
allows also the fixed effects to be correlated with the regressors and is more efficient as more 
information regarding the instrument is used. It is considered more efficient than the 
Anderson-Hsiao estimator, as it makes use of more moment conditions and more instruments. 
In particular, the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data differenced GMM estimator uses all 
available lags as instruments. However, also the Arellano and Bond (1991) method is found to 
be imprecise and inefficient due to weak instruments problem associated with using lagged 
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values to instrument the first-differenced variables. Blundell and Bond (1998) therefore 
propose to set further orthogonality conditions. This results in estimating a system of 
equations that consists of an equation in levels and one in first differences using lagged levels 
and lagged differences as instruments.  
The results part will provide a more detailed discussion on the instruments and estimation 
techniques used based on the underlying properties of the available data, especially the binary 
character of the key explanatory variables and the lag of the price-to-sales ratio. The 
Appendix (see Table 9 and explanations) will also provide basic results for the Anderson-
Hsiao estimator neglecting endogeneity of the key variables of interest. 
5.2. Choice of Variables 
Dependent variable financial performance 
The results of empirical analysis on the relation of specific CSR activity on a specific FP 
strongly depend on how CSR and FP are measured (see Margolis et al. 2007): concerning 
CSR, if it is business related or not and regarding FP, if it is an accounting-based or a market-
based measurement (see Margolis et al. 2007). The stock market performance is taken into 
consideration for the market-based approach. Whereas accounting-based measurements 
include company internal financial data like return-on-equity (ROE) (see Margolis et al. 
2007). Orlitzky et al. (2003) also differentiate between market-based as external market 
responses and accounting-based as internal efficiency financial performance measurement.  
We analyse the effect of a joint implementation of environmental innovation and CSR on the 
financial performance of a firm. Innovation and CSR are both forward-looking management 
strategies. This approach calls for market-based measurement of financial performance, 
replicating the long-term and future-oriented perspective. Therefore, we use price-to-sales 
ratio (P/Sit) as a market-based way of measuring financial performance (see Pava and Krausz 
1996, Orlitzky et al. 2003, Margolis et al. 2007). It reflects the value placed on sales by past 
performance, other companies or the market. The profit margin affects the price-to-sales ratio 
and therefore is a good indicator for market power. In our sample the P/S variable shows a 
right-skewed distribution. Thus we use firm i’s P/S in logarithm. 
Explanatory and control variables 
In the A4 database, additional variables explaining the market power like market share or the 
Herfindahl index are not available. Especially the large firms indexed on the stock market in 
A4 are firms acting worldwide and therefore the usage of such market power indicators is 
questionable, as Aghion et al. (2005) point out. These indicators are limited concerning 
worldwide acting companies because the geographic market definition is unclear. Alternatives 
like the Lerner index (see e.g. Aghion et al. (2005) or price-to-cost ratio (see e.g. 
Gorodnichenko et al. 2010) are also not included in the A4 database. Nevertheless, the panel 
data structure allows controlling for unobservable but time consistent factors of market power. 
Nickell (1996) explains that changes of unobservable factors correlate with the changes of the 
observable variables. In our case the inclusion of the lagged P/S (lag(P/S)it) controls for these 
unobservable factors and at the same time it considers that past financial performance may 
explain current financial performance.  
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Another explanatory variable for financial performance, especially from an investors' 
perspective and when measured by a market-based variable is a risk parameter. The risk 
coefficient beta as parameter for stocks’ volatility, which measures the risk of an investment, 
reflects the riskiness of the returns of a firm. Several previous empirical analyses of CSR and 
financial performance criticise that risk, which might affect future financial performance, is 
not adequately taken into account (see Orlitzky 2005, Margolis et al. 2007, Cochran and 
Wood 1984). CSR can serve as a risk management instrument in the way that CSR 
engagement could lower a firm’s risk (Husted 2005). Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001) provide 
evidence for this interlink of CSR and financial risk of a firm in their meta-analysis. 
Therefore, we include the variable beta (Betait) measuring the market risk, as an essential 
element when analysing the CSR-FP relationship. 
Moreover, we have to control for business cycles' effects on stock market value. The 
development of stock market prices may differ across countries and time due to business 
cycles effects. Thus, we need a time trend control that varies across countries. This effect is 
assumed to have very immediate impact, so no time lag is included. In addition, it is 
reasonable to consider the business cycle as exogenous. Therefore, information on real GDP 
(growth) by country and year is linked to the A4 database based on firms’ country affiliation 
and included as the control variable (GDP-Growthit). 
Patents are indicators for temporarily limited monopoly and a noisy measure for the stock of 
intangible assets. The company holding a patent has a technological advantage, which can be 
the reason for price differences resulting in a better performance. The benefit of the usage of 
US patents is their consistent measurement method and the relevancy of these patents. We use 
the logarithm number of real hold patents (ln(Patents)it) by a company in the specific year 
from the A4 database for our calculations because we assume that the stock of patents affects 
P/S in the same time period and is not time lagged. 
Moreover, the age of a company might influence its financial performance either positively, 
e.g. by learning effects, or negatively due to their limits in adjusting to new challenges. 
Hopenhayn (1992) shows under which circumstances older firms can gain higher profits. 
Therefore, age is an important factor when measuring financial performance and we include 
the age of the company as the explanatory variable (ln(Age)it).  
Furthermore, we control for the size of the company measured by sales in logarithm form 
(ln(Sales)it). The labour productivity of the company is included as number of employees by 
sales (ln(Labour/Sales)it) in logarithm. 
Additionally, to these traditional explanatory variables for financial performance, we focus on 
the effects of environmental innovation and CSR in our analysis.  
Environmental innovation 
Concerning the measurement of innovation, input and output of innovation can be 
differentiated. Smith (2005, p 151) discusses the traditional categorization of innovation into 
ideas, learning, creation of knowledge on the one hand and competence and capabilities on 
the other hand. In the Oslo Manual, innovation input is explained as investments, which 
include R&D (see also Kleinknecht et al. 2002) and other innovation related investments. 
Furthermore, other kinds of preparation for different types of innovation like relationships to 
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universities to deploy external knowledge can be treated as innovation input (OECD and 
European Commission 2005). In empirical literature R&D expenditures are often taken as an 
input innovation variable, due to its long history of collection and the comparability between 
countries in contrast to other input innovation determinants (Kleinknecht et al. 2002, Smith 
2005).16  
In our approach we focus on voluntary action of a firm in the environmental context. 
Therefore, the appropriate innovation variable available in the A4 database is the dichotomous 
variable named environmental R&D (EnvInnoit). It provides information on whether the firm 
invested in R&D related to environmentally friendly products and processes to reduce 
emission and resource consumption. This allows us to categorise environmentally innovating 
and non-environmentally innovating firms. Nonetheless, the dichotomous variable to measure 
innovation is rather rough, as especially for large companies it is not clear which efforts have 
been made and how this affects the environmental activity of the firm. However, as the A4 
database does not provide further indicators on environmental innovation, this research is a 
first step to investigate how a specific CSR activity might support environmental R&D. 
Current environmental R&D investments are an indicator for the future market value of a 
firm. However, this kind of innovation is not easily observable for customers, investors or 
other business partners. Hence, it is plausible to assume that CSR might help to overcome this 
information asymmetry in the case of environmental R&D investment. 
CSR 
Our approach to the complementary character of CSR and environmental innovation is based 
on the consideration that CSR serves as a signal to stakeholders for environmentally friendly 
production. Firms’ CSR activities are often self-reported and consumers are sceptical about 
them. Certification of third parties on the CSR activity of a company can serve as a signal and 
create credibility and therefore support the consumers, workers, investors, and trading 
partners in their decisions. Therefore, firms can gain benefits from spreading this information. 
This is in line with findings by Terlaak and King (2006), who apply the signalling theory to 
certified management standards to overcome information asymmetries resulting in 
competitive advantage. 
In the A4 database, the CSR indicator related to our approach is the dichotomous variable 
Global Report Initiative (CSRit). This variable reveals if the company publishes its CSR report 
according to the Global Report Initiative (GRI) guidelines and the variable serves as a proxy 
for firm’s CSR performance. These guidelines are developed to standardize sustainability 
reporting and create transparency and comparability of companies around the world. The 
guidelines include over 100 very detailed indicators on firm’s sustainability in the areas 
economic, environmental, social, and governance. Reports according to the GRI guidelines 
can be treated as a method of certification because the GRI reporting comprises detailed 
information and a third party ensures that the data is in accordance with the guidelines. 
Furthermore, the reports are publicly published and the data is available through the GRI 
database. Although the formulation of the indicator may only suggest if the firm reports 
according to the GRI guidelines and not if the firm is really engaged in CSR activities, we 
16 For a deeper discussion on R&D as innovation input, please see e.g. Kleinknecht et al. (2002) or Smith (2005). 
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assume that in practice only firms engaged in CSR activities report on them and in turn decide 
if they report in such detail as demanded by GRI.17  
Our dichotomy variable combines the different CSR activities as it is an overarching indicator 
on the firm’s CSR engagement. As such, the variable is a signal for the firms’ social and 
environmental most common CSR definition in literature and practice, which includes all firm 
activities that integrate social and environmental concerns into business practices and that go 
beyond mere legal requirements. However, judging a company’s social and environmental 
engagement by only one indicator is a rather crude measurement (see Cochran and Wood 
1984 for a discussion on third-party rankings), particularly as these indicators are 
dichotomous variables which might not vary much over time. If a firm introduced CSR 
reporting according to the GRI guidelines once, the firm might not go a step backwards and 
abolish the external audition. Nevertheless, the data in the A4 database shows enough 
variation (see description above) for the estimation strategy. Though, in interpreting the 
results the rough measurement of CSR has to be taken into account.  
Table 2 provides the overview of the chosen variables with a short explanation, together with 
the mean, the standard deviation, and the minimum and maximum values.  
Table 2: Overview variables and descriptive statistics (6,737 observations) 
Variable Definition Mean (SD) Min/Max 
ln(P/S)it Logarithm of price-to-sales ratio 
0.1759 
(0.9624) -2.2964/2.9498 
ln(Patents)it 
Hold US patents by company in 
logarithm 
0.5109 
(1.6150) 0/9.9739 
Betait Risk parameter beta 
1.1060 
(0.6208) -2.4691/6.6454 
GDP-Growthit 
Real GDP growth by country and 
year 
0.0089 
(0.0277) -0.0854/0.1270 
ln(Age)it Age of a company as logarithm 
3.8521 
(0.9357) 1.2528/6.2851 
ln(Sales)it 
Logarithm of sales for size of the 
company 
22.4038 
(1.3987) 18.0315/26.7973 
Ln(Labour/Sales)it 
Labour productivity of company as 
logarithm of employees by sales 
-12.9804 
(0.9110) -18.1888/-9.4769 
EnvInnoit 
Dichotomous innovation variable 
environmental R&D 
0.1542 
(0.3612) 0/1 
CSRit 
Dichotomous CSR variable on CSR 
reporting according to Global Report 
Initiative guidelines 
0.2228 
(0.4162) 0/1 
 
6. Results  
We conducted preliminary tests on fixed effects versus random effects models. As a first step, 
the F-test on the null hypothesis of no fixed effects is rejected. The Hausman-Test with the 
17 Please note, that on the long run the company would take unnecessary risk if it reports on CSR engagement, 
which turns out to be false or if the set targets are not reached.  
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null hypothesis of no correlation was rejected, too. Therefore, we use a fixed-effects model 
with robust standard errors for the following dynamic panel estimations in a base model.  
As a first step we estimate the model 1 with the logged growth in price-per-sales as dependent 
variable and without the complementary variables of our interest to test if the traditional 
variables explaining the growth in price-per-sales are in direction and size as expected from 
previous research (Table 3). The results verify that our dynamic approach including the one 
year time lag of price-per-sales (ln(P/S)it-1) is appropriate due to high significance and size 
and direction comparable to previous studies. The high negative coefficient shows marginally 
decreasing growth rates in P/S. A one percent increase in the lagged price-to-sales ratio is 
significantly associated with a 0.83 percent smaller growth rate in the price-to-sales ratio 
between the periods t and t-1. Or in other words, the higher the firm i’s price-to-sales ratio 
already is, the lower are the rates of growth. Furthermore, risk (Betait) affects the P/S growth 
negatively as expected and is highly significant. The GDP growth (GDP-Growthit) is highly 
significant and shows that the business cycles’ effects varying across countries and time 
influence the stock market value (scaled by total sales) very strongly. Sales (ln(Sales)it) affect 
the P/S growth significantly negatively. The variables productivity (ln(Labour/Sales)it), age 
(ln(Age)it), and stock of patents (ln(Patents)it) are not significant in our model 1.  
Model 2 provides the results for the dependent variable in logarithm (ln(P/S)it) according to 
the previously explained estimation strategy, which we also use in the further estimation 
models. Compared to the growth of P/Sit as a dependent variable, the lag of price-per-sales 
appears here with a positive effect, which shows that previous performance influences future 
performance positively and is exactly the value of the coefficient in the growth model 1 plus 
1, of course. The other coefficients are necessarily exactly the same in size and direction.  
In the following, we concentrate on the exclusive variables environmental innovation 
(EnvInnoit), CSR (CSRit), and doing both strategies together (BOTHit) by including them in 
the estimations. The additional variables do not change the basic model results.  
Model 3 shows that a firm strategy of either doing environmental innovation or CSR alone has 
no significant impact on P/S. Implementing both strategies jointly reveals a highly positively 
significant effect on a firm’s P/S. The firms that introduced both strategies jointly enjoy a 8.46 
percent higher price-to-sales ratio compared to the control group, i.e. firms that neither engage 
in environmental R&D activities nor in CSR. Based on our assumptions this suggests that 
reporting to the GRI guidelines might help to signal the pro-environmental action of firms. 
The one-sided t-test for complementarity against the null that EnvInnoit + CSRit - BOTHit ≥ 0, 
supports complementarity. However, we can only reject the null hypothesis with a 90% 
probability, which would imply complementarity of environmental innovations and GRI as 
CSR activity, but the result might not hold for all industries or firms.  
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Table 3: Estimation Results Base Models 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: FE robust FE robust FE robust 
 gr(P/S)it ln(P/S)it ln(P/S)it 
ln(P/S)it-1 -0.830*** 0.170*** 0.166*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0235) 
Betait -0.233*** -0.233*** -0.232*** 
 (0.0326) (0.0326) (0.0326) 
GDP-Growthit 3.460*** 3.460*** 3.492*** 
 (0.626) (0.626) (0.623) 
ln(Sales)it -0.474*** -0.474*** -0.476*** 
 (0.0441) (0.0441) (0.0441) 
ln(Labour/Sales)it -0.0567 -0.0567 -0.0545 
 (0.0430) (0.0430) (0.0428) 
ln(Patents)it 0.00244 0.00244 0.00237 
 (0.00517) (0.00517) (0.00514) 
ln(Age)it -0.0781 -0.0781 -0.0715 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.104) 
EnvInnoit   0.00688 
   (0.0261) 
CSRit    0.0285 
   (0.0204) 
BOTHit   0.0846*** 
   (0.0280) 
Constant 10.54*** 10.54*** 10.56*** 
 (0.967) (0.967) (0.966) 
Observations 6,737 6,737 6,737 
R2 within 0.620 0.532 0.533 
Rho 0.819 0.819 0.818 
Test for complementarity: H0 (full test): EnvInnoit + CSRit –BOTHit ≥ 0 
Test Statistic 
p-value 
  2.10 
0.0736 
Note: The model includes four jointly-significant year dummies. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In the following, we apply GMM models to further explore the complementarity of the firm 
strategies of environmental innovation and CSR. The inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable in the models 1-3 might violate the strict exogeneity assumption as explained above. 
Furthermore, the management decision on doing environmental innovation or engage in CSR 
might also be endogenous. As the database does not provide adequate instruments, we 
estimate models with a dynamic GMM approach suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
These types of models use estimations in differences which allows applying lags as 
instruments (Table 4). The model is based on a two-step GMM procedure to yield more 
efficient, i.e. heteroscedasticity robust estimates. As such, models 4-6 include as 
instrumentation vector the controls 𝑪𝑪𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 as differences. The potentially endogenous variable 
ln(P/S)it-1 is instrumented by the second and any further time lags. The variables EnvInnoit, 
CSRit, BOTHit are instrumented by the first and any further time lags in model 4, or the 
moving average in model 5, and both – the first and further time lags as well as the moving 
average – in model 6.  
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Table 4: Estimation Results GMM Models 
 (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: GMM GMM GMM 
 ln(P/S)it ln(P/S)it ln(P/S)it 
ln(P/S)it-1 0.391*** 0.409*** 0.366*** 
 (0.0491) (0.0474) (0.0435) 
Betait -0.146*** -0.141*** -0.133*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0348) (0.0356) 
GDP-Growthit 1.640** 1.606** 1.808** 
 (0.755) (0.784) (0.774) 
ln(Sales)it -0.576*** -0.594*** -0.581*** 
 (0.0478) (0.0473) (0.0457) 
ln(Labour/Sales)it -0.111** -0.130*** -0.134*** 
 (0.0449) (0.0487) (0.0465) 
ln(Patents)it 0.000697 -0.000447 -0.00294 
 (0.00547) (0.00548) (0.00544) 
ln(Age)it 0.0837 0.0784 0.0541 
 (0.0932) (0.0956) (0.0996) 
EnvInnoit -0.00337 -0.0826** -0.0335* 
 (0.0409) (0.0359) (0.0189) 
CSRit  -0.0590 0.0118 0.00903 
 (0.0444) (0.0246) (0.0180) 
BOTHit 0.114* 0.0166 0.0470* 
 (0.0613) (0.0345) (0.0270) 
Observations 6,737 6,737 6,737 
Instruments 
2-year and any 
further lags of 
ln(P/S)it, 
1-year and any 
further lags of 
EnviInnoit, 
CSRit, BOTHit 
2-year and any 
further lags of 
ln(P/S)it,, 
moving 
average of 
EnvInnoit, 
CSRit, BOTHit 
2-year and any 
further lags of 
ln(P/S)it, 
1-year and any 
further lags and 
moving average of 
EnvInnot, CSRit, 
BOTHit 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first 
differences 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences 
0.713 0.636 0.775 
Sargan-Hansen test: 2-year and any further lags of ln(P/S)it 
Excluding group 
Difference 
0.041 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.102 
0.000 
Sargan-Hansen test: 1-year and any further lags of EnvInnoit, CSRit, and BOTHit 
Excluding group 
Difference 
0.000 
0.025 
 
 
0.000 
0.990 
Sargan-Hansen test: moving average of EnvInnoit, CSRit, and BOTHit 
Excluding group 
Difference 
 
 
0.000 
0.001 
0.000 
0.714 
Test for complementarity: H0 (full test): EnvInnoit + CSRit –BOTHit ≥ 0 
Test Statistic 
p-value 
10.10 
0.0007 
5.17 
0.0115 
5.28 
0.0108 
Note: The model includes four jointly-significant year dummies. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Compared to the model 3, the GMM estimation in model 4 shows smaller coefficients, except 
for the lagged P/S, and in some cases lower significance levels for the traditional variables 
influencing P/S. Nevertheless, the directions are comparable to the previous results. The 
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coefficient estimates of the variables of interest, environmental innovation and CSR, are again 
not statistically different from zero (however, their sign is now negative). Concerning 
engagement in both strategies jointly (BOTHit), model 4 confirms the results from the basic 
models as there is a positive effect on P/S but only significant at the 10% level. The test 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for auto-correlation in an auto-regressive process of 
the first order (AR1) shows significant serial correlation, but no significant evidence of serial 
correlation in the first-differenced errors at order two (p=0.713), which allows us to use lags 
higher than two as instruments. The Sargan-Hansen test for over-identification against the null 
– that the vector of instruments is orthogonal to the vector of the errors (or against the null 
that the instruments are exogenous) – shows that the instrumentation of the variable ln(P/S)it-1 
is not strictly exogenous (p=0.000). Unfortunately, the database does not provide better 
instruments and also estimations and tests with longer time lags reveal the same endogeneity 
problem. Therefore, we have to interpret the results with care. Although formal endogeneity is 
observable, it might not strongly affect the market value during the next year in reality as the 
P/S is a year-end value. The tests for the subset of instruments with the lags of EnvInnoit, 
CSRit, BOTHit confirm exogeneity slighty over the 1% level. This might indicate that the strict 
exogeneity assumption could be violated. 
Therefore, we use the moving averages as instruments instead for the innovation and CSR 
variables as instruments in model 5. For the moving average we calculated the average of the 
sum of the current, one year, and two year time lag for each of the variables EnvInnoit, CSRit, 
BOTHit. In this model the traditional variables are similar to model 4, except for the 
coefficient estimate of the stock of patents (ln(Patents)it) which is in all models not 
significant. The variables of a pure CSR strategy and a joint CSR and R&D strategy are not 
significant. However, now environmental R&D affects P/S significantly negative (5% level) 
but only with a small coefficient. Again the Arellano-Bond test at order one shows significant 
serial correlation, but no significant evidence of serial correlation in the first-differenced 
errors at order two (p=0.636). The null hypothesis of exogeneity of the subsets of instruments 
has to be rejected at the conventional 10 or 5% levels for both subsets.  
Hence, we estimate the model 6 including all instruments, the instrument of ln(P/S)it-1 and the 
of the variables EnvInnoit, CSRit, BOTHit. Again the instrument of ln(P/S)it-1 is object to 
endogeneity. The instruments for our variables of concern show in model 6 that they are 
exogenous at the 5% (p=0.051) or the 10% level (p=0.344) and would imply that they are 
appropriate instruments. Related to the previous fixed-effects estimations and the model 3 
results in combination with the tests on exogeneity of the instruments, model 6 seems the best 
available estimation strategy for our data. The results for the estimations in model 6 approve 
mostly the previous results in direction and values. Here like in model 5 the variable patents 
(ln(Patents)it) is negative, but like in the other models not significant. The focus of our 
research lies in the variables for innovation, CSR and their joint implementation. Model 6 
shows again a positive effect of doing both strategies (innovation and CSR) together and this 
time the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level. The value is comparable to the 
other models. Thus, with the moving average as instruments the joint innovation-CSR 
strategy gets significant and the size of coefficient estimate is also close the previous models. 
Concerning the complementarity we test whether condition (1) holds. We can reject the null 
with 98% or higher in all GMM models. This implies complementarity of environmental 
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R&D and CSR. All models confirm complementarity of environmental innovation and CSR 
in form of reporting according through the GRI guidelines.  
Nevertheless, as the instruments in our models are restricted and might violate the strict 
exogeneity assumption, further robustness checks are needed to verify the results so far. 
Furthermore, the sample includes a huge number of firms in the service sector which 
questions if it is appropriate to test environmental innovation activity and its possible 
disclosure via CSR, and if other CSR variables than GRI reporting might serve as better 
signal for environmental R&D. Therefore, we run further robustness checks addressing these 
possible drawbacks of our models which are the objectives in the next section.  
7. Robustness Checks  
In a first robustness check, the sample is restricted to only the manufacturing industries (see 
shaded area in Table 7). This limits our sample to 2,878 observation and 820 firms observed 
for the years 2005 to 2009. Running the same models as with the full sample leads to 
following estimation results. 
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Table 5: Estimation Results GMM Models for Manufacturing Industries 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Dependent variable: FE robust GMM GMM GMM 
 ln(P/S)it ln(P/S)it ln(P/S)it ln(P/S)it 
     
ln(P/S)it-1 0.111*** 0.287*** 0.350*** 0.292*** 
 (0.0322) (0.0786) (0.0724) (0.0683) 
Betait -0.197*** -0.111** -0.107** -0.102** 
 (0.0461) (0.0447) (0.0450) (0.0415) 
GDP-Growthit 3.005*** 2.188* 2.346* 2.423* 
 (0.977) (1.302) (1.356) (1.311) 
ln(Sales)it -0.434*** -0.532*** -0.563*** -0.596*** 
 (0.0917) (0.0876) (0.0974) (0.0903) 
ln(Labour/Sales)it -0.122 -0.142 -0.175 -0.190* 
 (0.0775) (0.0875) (0.109) (0.0969) 
ln(Patents)it 0.00259 -1.99e-05 -0.00371 -0.00455 
 (0.00602) (0.00627) (0.00665) (0.00678) 
ln(Age)it -0.190 0.149 0.100 0.169 
 (0.168) (0.146) (0.146) (0.151) 
EnvInnoit  0.0140 -0.0160 -0.0805** -0.0366 
 (0.0320) (0.0437) (0.0406) (0.0240) 
CSRit  0.0176 -0.134** 0.0127 0.00599 
 (0.0285) (0.0613) (0.0432) (0.0265) 
BOTHit 0.0488 0.000594 -0.0221 0.0103 
 (0.0382) (0.0925) (0.0512) (0.0347) 
Constant 9.257***    
 (2.092)    
Observations 2,878 2,878 2,878 2,878 
R2 0.531    
Rho 0.841    
Instruments 
 2-year and any 
further lags of 
ln(P/S)it, 
1-year and any 
further lags of 
EnvInnot, CSRit, 
BOTHit 
2-year and any 
further lags of 
ln(P/S)it,, 
moving average of 
EnvInnoit, CSRit, 
BOTHit 
2-year and any 
further lags of 
ln(P/S)it, 
1-year and any 
further lags and 
moving average of 
EnvInnoit, CSRit, 
BOTHit 
Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(1) in first 
differences 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(2) in first 
differences 
 0.0639 0.0141 0.0248 
Sargan-Hansen test: 2-year and any further lags of ln(P/S)it 
Excluding group 
Difference 
 0.526 
0.000 
0.011 
0.000 
0.541 
0.000 
Sargan-Hansen test: 1-year and any further lags of EnvInnoit, CSRit, and BOTHit 
Excluding group 
Difference 
 0.000 
0.921 
 
 
0.000 
0.998 
Sargan-Hansen test: moving average of EnvInnoit, CSRit, and BOTHit 
Excluding group 
Difference 
  0.000 
0.300 
0.000 
0.503 
Test for complementarity: H0 (full test): EnvInnoit + CSRit –BOTHit ≥ 0 
Test Statistic 
p-value 
0.15 
0.3472 
4.76 
0.0146 
0.78 
0.1890 
1.02 
0.1569 
Note: The model includes four jointly-significant year dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Also with the restricted sample of only including the manufacturing industry, the estimation 
models confirm the previous effects of the traditional explanatory variables. Although the 
instruments seem to work better in the restricted sample, the effects of the variables of interest 
are not in a clear direction when comparing the different models. Furthermore, the 
complementarity test would rather imply no complementarity. This would imply for our 
hypothesis that the firm’s GRI reporting is a rather poor signal for CSR in the manufacturing 
sector. However, the descriptive analysis shows that in some of the manufacturing industries 
both strategies are implemented at the same time. Additional data especially on sectors with 
environmental R&D activity would be needed to verify results and reveal for which sectors 
CSR reporting might serve as a signal for their clients.  
Another critical point is the choice of GRI as CSR variable. As mentioned above, this 
indicator is just a rough measurement of firm’s CSR activity as it is a dichotomous variable. A 
further limit might be that the indicator only tells us if the firm reports according to the GRI 
guidelines, which does not necessarily reveal much about the specific activities. As the A4 
database provides mainly dichotomous indicators, which are suitable for our research focus, 
we cannot overcome most of these concerns. Nevertheless, in order to assess whether also 
other CSR indicators might serve as a signal for environmental R&D or if the results are 
dependent of the choice of CSR variable, like Margolis et al. (2007) and Orlitzky et al. (2003) 
stress, is the objective of the following robustness check.  
For this purpose we use the variable Sustainability External Audit (CSRit). This variable 
reveals if the company has an external auditor of its CSR/Sustainability report. As such the 
variable could signal the firms’ social and environmental CSR activities. 
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Table 6: Estimation Results GMM Models for CSR variable Sustainability External Audit 
 (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Dependent variable: FE robust GMM GMM GMM 
 ln(P/S)it ln(P/S)it ln(P/S)it ln(P/S)it 
lag-ln(P/S)it 0.168*** 0.390*** 0.430*** 0.391*** 
 (0.0235) (0.0477) (0.0469) (0.0465) 
Betait -0.232*** -0.160*** -0.153*** -0.152*** 
 (0.0326) (0.0353) (0.0361) (0.0365) 
GDP-Growthit 3.485*** 1.390* 1.351* 1.576** 
 (0.623) (0.783) (0.775) (0.799) 
ln(Sales)it -0.474*** -0.595*** -0.612*** -0.603*** 
 (0.0443) (0.0477) (0.0479) (0.0461) 
ln(Labour/Sales)it -0.0565 -0.106** -0.126*** -0.119*** 
 (0.0431) (0.0445) (0.0470) (0.0455) 
ln(Patents)it 0.00248 0.00235 -0.000962 0.00104 
 (0.00516) (0.00558) (0.00568) (0.00566) 
ln(Age)it -0.0780 0.0866 0.109 0.0885 
 (0.104) (0.0949) (0.0974) (0.102) 
EnvInnoit 0.0264 -0.0450 -0.0560 -0.0154 
 (0.0251) (0.0564) (0.0393) (0.0197) 
CSRit -0.00980 -0.0211 0.00375 0.00390 
 (0.0276) (0.0509) (0.0351) (0.0210) 
BOTHit 0.0443 0.0186 -0.0449 -0.00942 
 (0.0312) (0.0744) (0.0423) (0.0302) 
Constant 10.54***    
 (0.969)    
Observations 6,737 6,737 6,737 6,737 
R2 0.533    
Rho 0.819    
Instruments  2-year and any 
further lags of 
ln(P/S)it, 
1-year and any 
further lags of 
Envinnoit, 
CSRit, BOTHit 
2-year and any 
further lags of 
ln(P/S)it,, 
moving average 
of EnvInnoit, 
CSRit, BOTHit 
2-year and any 
further lags of 
ln(P/S)it, 
1-year and any 
further lags and 
moving average 
of EnvInnoit, 
CSRit, BOTHit 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in 
first differences 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
first differences 
 0.750 0.540 0.679 
Sargan-Hansen test: 2-year and any further lags of ln(P/S)it 
Excluding group 
Difference 
 0.010 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.003 
0.000 
Sargan-Hansen test: 1-year and any further lags of EnvInnoit, CSRit, and BOTHit 
Excluding group 
Difference 
 0.000 
0.022 
 
 
0.000 
0.681 
Sargan-Hansen test: moving average of EnvInnoit, CSRit, and BOTHit 
Excluding group 
Difference 
  0.000 
0.004 
0.000 
0.453 
Test for complementarity: H0 (full test): EnvInnoit + CSRit –BOTHit ≥ 0 
Test Statistic 
p-value 
0.53 
0.2339 
1.58 
0.1042 
0.02 
0.4407 
0.00 
0.4766 
Note: The model includes four jointly-significant year dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The traditional explanatory variables confirm the results of the previous models with the GRI 
reporting as CSR variable. However, the models 12-15 with the Sustainability External Audit 
as CSR variable show different effects of the variables of interest in direction although not 
significant. The instruments in model 15 seem to fit best in comparison to the models 13 and 
14. The complementarity test shows no complementarity at conventional significance levels. 
This implies that the CSR variable Sustainability External Audit is a poor signal for 
environmental innovation in our sample.  
8. Discussion and concluding remarks  
The signalling literature suggests that signals serve as information on unobservable attributes 
(Spence 2002) to overcome information asymmetries. We apply the signalling theory to the 
environmental engagement of a firm. As such, we use firm’s environmental R&D activities, 
which are hard to observe for stakeholders. Therefore, a signal to communicate the firm’s 
environmental activities as a whole is needed to differentiate from competitors and gain an 
advantage. CSR, which has become more and more important in the last years, can verify a 
firm’s pro-social and pro-environmental engagement and serve as a signal. This is a signal in 
the sense of Wernerfelt's (1988) reputational economies of scale, which creates reputation not 
only for one product but for the firm as a whole. As such, CSR is a source of capabilities in 
the resource-based view of the firm: CSR creates reputation and in turn leads to higher 
financial performance. Thereby, we analyse if CSR as a signal complements the 
environmental R&D activity of a firm and whether a joint strategy leads to higher financial 
performance. 
Using data about global companies from the ASSET4 database, we examine if environmental 
R&D and the reporting according to GRI guidelines are complementary, and consequently we 
research, if the joint strategy leads to better financial performance. Our different analyses 
rather support the hypothesis that a joint strategy of environmental R&D and CSR reporting 
according to GRI leads to higher financial performance, although the effects are rather small. 
In other words, environmental innovators can verify their activity by GRI reporting and attract 
clients. How this works with specific clients such as consumers or investors should be 
addressed in further research.  
However, our results do not allow a conclusion for CSR in general, which our additional 
analyses with a different CSR variable reveal. We cannot conclude that CSR per se is 
beneficial for environmental innovators. As already Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001) and 
Margolis et al. (2007) pointed out, the effect of CSR on the financial performance of a firm 
depends on the measurement of CSR. Our results support this viewpoint and reveal that not 
every kind of CSR is suitable to transport unobservable signals of firms’ environmental R&D 
engagement when applying signalling theory. Furthermore, the descriptive statistics might 
give additional explanation that the relation of environmental R&D and CSR depends on the 
location of the firm and the industry. On the one hand, this supports the resource-based view 
of the firm that creating reputation which in turn leads to higher financial performance 
depends on the uniqueness of capabilities and their specific usage. Therefore, R&D as well as 
CSR are not advantageous in general. On the other hand, the behavioural view comes into 
play suggesting that personal values are needed for a social strategy of the firm especially 
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when we interpret our results against the background of the descriptive statistics, which say 
that in Europe and Asia more firms do both strategies together. Further research would be 
needed to analyse if such values are more expected or more accepted by firm’s stakeholders in 
these countries than in other countries.  
Further limits of our analysis accrue from data limitations. In particular, the different firm 
strategies might be object to endogeneity as they might contribute to the same personal 
management values. The instrumentation via the lagged variables and the moving averages is 
limited. The results need verification with additional data, which might be possible in the 
future as more and more data on GRI reporting will be available. Moreover, as the ASSET4 
database mainly provides dichotomous variables, which might not change much over time, 
further research with more detailed data would give better insight. Another drawback is the 
composition of the sample with a huge number of firms in the service sector, which might 
report their CSR activity, but are not engaged in innovation.  
Nevertheless, our study provides first results on complementarity of environmental R&D and 
CSR related to the signalling theory. As such, it tries to overcome the drawback of previous 
cross-sectional analysis not accounting for unobservable factors by using panel data. We can 
verify that the signalling effect of CSR strongly depends on the type of CSR.  
9. Managerial implications 
Furthermore, our study has implication for the practice. The results reveal that managers 
should not engage CSR activities just for the sake of signalling that they are good. As the 
analyses show, not each reporting of CSR works equally well. Managers should first ensure if 
additional information on their pro-environmental (or also pro-social) engagement is 
necessary and appreciated by their clients. If this is the case, a signal can only work if it could 
carry the unobservable attributes and overcome the information asymmetry as intended. As 
such, it should be a credible signal which the clients are familiar with and which they can 
easily observe and verify. Third party certification of an overall CSR report might serve as a 
comprehensive signal for a firm’s pro-environmental and pro-social engagement.  
However, as the analyses show the effect on financial performance, although significant, is 
rather small. Nevertheless, as the demand for firms' engagement in environmental and social 
concerns might further increase, a strategy how to signal such activities might also become 
more important.   
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Appendix 
 
Table 7: Overview Industry Sectors (6,737 observations) 
Industry Sectors SIC No. of observations Percent 
Mining 364 5.40% 
Construction 237 3.52% 
Manufacture Food 297 4.41% 
Manufacture Wood, Paper, Print 279 4.14% 
Manufacture Chemicals 525 7.79% 
Manufacture Metal, Machinery, Transport Eq. 698 10.36% 
Manufacture Computers, Electronic Eq. 480 7.12% 
Manufacture Others 599 8.89% 
Transport, Communication, Electric 843 12.51% 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 583 8.65% 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 1,281 19.01% 
Services 551 8.18% 
Total 6,737 100.00% 
 
Table 8: Overview environmental R&D and CSR variables 
Year Overall Environmental R&D CSR 
 No. of 
obs. 
No. of observed 
firms with R&D 
Share of observed 
firms with R&D 
No. of observed 
firms with CSR 
Share of observed 
firms with CSR 
2005 781 51 6.53% 66 8.45% 
2006 1,377 82 5.95% 119 8.64% 
2007 1,751 234 13.36% 394 22.50% 
2008 1,724 372 21.58% 547 31.73% 
2009 1,104 300 27.17% 375 33.97% 
Total 6,737 1,039 15.42% 1,501 22.28% 
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Figure 1: Development of the topic CSR in research 
 
 
Note: Since 1955 and 2014, 532,981 publications (journal articles) in the business and economic literature are 
reported in the Web of Science database, where the year 2014 contributes to this sum with 24,351 publications. 
The overall number of 1,194 journal articles in the subfield of Corporate Social Responsibility has been 
identified on the base of the appearance of at least one of the following keywords in the articles’ title: 
“Corporate Social Responsi*”, or CSR, or “Corporate Social Performance”, or “CSP”, or “Corporate 
Responsi*”, where the wildcard * represents any further letters. The black dotted line refers to the share of 
these CSR publications in all economic and business publications in percent (left ordinate axis).  
In a similar fashion, the 15,347 articles in the business and economics literature dealing with innovation and 
technical change have been selected in case at least one of the following non-key sensitive key words appeared 
in the title: Inventi*, or Innovati*, or “Techn* Change”, or “Research and Development”, or R&D, or 
Technology. CSR publications related to the area of environmental issues have been identified based on the 
appearance of at least one aforementioned CSR key word in the title as well as one of the following key words: 
Environment*, or “Eco-*”, or “Resource-Saving”, or “Energy*”, or Carbon, or “Climate Change”, or 
Pollution, or “Pollution Control”, or “Pollution Abatement”, or “Sustainab*”, or Clean, or Wind, or Solar, 
or Photovoltaic, or Biomass.  
However, the selection of the key words is highly subjective so the results provided in Figure 1 do not claim 
completeness.  
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Figure 2: Unbalanced panel data sample (6737 observations) 
 
Figure 3: Sample and environmental R&D 
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 Figure 4: Sample and CSR 
 
 
Figure 5: Overview panel data and innovation and CSR categories 
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 Figure 6: Overview panel data and innovation and CSR categories by continents 
 
Figure 7: Overview panel data and innovation and CSR categories by industry 
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Anderson-Hsiao Estimator 
Table 9 below provides the results for the basic dynamic model setup where the endogeneity 
of the lagged dependent variables has been accounted for but not the endogeneity of the key 
variables of interest. 
Table 9: Estimation Results Anderson-Hsiao Estimator 
 (App. 1) (App. 2) 
 AH robust First Stage 
Dependent variable: ∆ln(P/Sit) ∆ln(P/Sit-1) 
   
∆ln(P/S)it-1 -2.754**  
 (1.093)  
∆ln(P/S)it-2  0.0478** 
  (0.0198) 
∆Betait -0.397*** -0.0268 
 (0.0756) (0.0198) 
∆GDP-Growthit 30.02*** 8.003*** 
 (8.807) (0.292) 
∆ln(Sales)it 0.349 0.357*** 
 (0.413) (0.0338) 
∆ln(Labour/Sales)it 0.0353 0.0357 
 (0.0828) (0.0282) 
∆ln(Patents)it -0.00836 -0.00137 
 (0.0107) (0.00383) 
∆ln(Age)it -0.0645 -0.0667 
 (0.308) (0.114) 
∆EnvInnot  0.0558 0.0456** 
 (0.0719) (0.0184) 
∆CSRit  0.106 0.0570*** 
 (0.0724) (0.0140) 
∆BOTHit 0.207** 0.0809*** 
 (0.104) (0.0221) 
Constant 0.0412 0.0123 
 (0.0277) (0.00786) 
   
Observations 5,633 5,633 
R-squared  0.219 
rho . . 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The most obvious insight from this table is that the coefficient estimate of the lagged 
dependent variable is far away from plausible values and far away from the very basic OLS 
estimates provided in Table 3. The likely reason is a considerable instrumental variable bias 
due to a weak instrument problem. Recall that the results from Table 9 rely on a mode setup 
where all variables enter the model in differences. Although the correlation of the price-to-
sales ratio in period t and t-1 is relatively high (0.883), the correlation of the first differences 
and lagged first differences is very small (-0.2354) making it a bad instrument. Taking 
furthermore the first stage regressions into account supports this view. The coefficient 
estimate of the excluded instrument in the structural equation is relatively low let alone the 
fact that its level of significance is rather small supporting the concern of a weak instrument 
problem. In particular, the F-statistic of the excluded instrument in the first stage regression 
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(F=5.81) is far away from areas seen as to support non-weakness of instruments. Staiger and 
Stock (1997) propose a rule of thumb of a value of 10 for the first stage F-statistic of a single 
excluded instrument to provide evidence for non-weakness. The central insight from this 
simple experiment is straightforward. Even in this basic setup which only addresses the 
endogeneity of one variable, namely the lagged dependent variable, the Anderson-Hsiao 
estimator performs rather poorly given our data as lagged differences of the price-to-sales 
ratio, which is only loosely correlated little with current values. Therefore, further lags as 
instrument might help mitigate this problem as in the Arellano-Bond GMM case. In this 
sense, the Arellano-Bond estimator seems to be a better choice allowing more consistent 
estimates, at least in part. 
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